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a b s t r a c t
Aparadigmatic exampleof anemotionalbias indecisionmaking is the framingeffect,where themanner in
which a choice is posed – as a potential loss or a potential gain – systematically biases an ensuing decision.
Two fMRI studies have shown that the activation in the amygdala is modulated by the framing effect.
Here, contrary to an expectation based on these studies, we show that two patients with Urbach-Wiethe
(UW) disease, a rare condition associated with congenital, complete bilateral amygdala degeneration,eywords:
ecision making
isk
motion
ationality
exhibit an intact framing effect. However, choice preference in these patients did show a qualitatively
distinct pattern compared to controls evident in an increased propensity to gamble, indicating that loss
of amygdala function does exert an overall inﬂuence on risk-taking. These ﬁndings suggest either that
amygdala does contribute to decision making but does not play a causal role in framing, or that UW is
not a pure lesion model of amygdala function.
 rain-lesion
rbach-Wiethe
People often make suboptimal decisions. A striking example is
rovided by an inﬂuence of irrelevant, emotionally valenced, con-
exts. In a paradigmatic experimental situation participants are
sked to choose between a surewin or loss and a risky gamble. Nor-
atively, such decisions should reﬂect maximisation of subjective
tility, but it turns out these decisions are subject to subtle devi-
tions from optimality that reﬂect the manner in which choices
re framed. Framing a choice as a potential win or a loss biases
ecision-makers to express a greater proportion of risky choices
nder the loss frame compared to that under the win frame, a ﬁnd-
ng termed the ‘framing effect’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For
xample, people typically prefer D5 to a 50% chance ofwinning D10,
ut prefer 50% chance of losing D10 to a sure loss of D5. That the
ias induced by the frame is emotional is evident in the emotional
esponses the frame evokes in neurologically intact participants,
ho exhibit higher autonomic arousal – measured with skin con-
uctance responses (SCRs) – in the loss relative to the win frame
De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 2008).
Brain imaging studies implicate the amygdala, orbitofrontal cor-
ex (OFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in the framing
ffect (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Roiser et
l., 2009). Research in animals reveals that the amygdala encodes
he incentive value of stimuli, and through its connectivity with
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other areas exerts a motivational inﬂuence on multiple instru-
mental responses (Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt, 2002).
Consequently, amygdala lesions can impair cost–beneﬁt analyse
in animals, leading to suboptimal evaluation of risk (Ghods-Shariﬁ,
Onge, & Floresco, 2009). Similarly, human amygdala lesions engen-
der more risky and ultimately disadvantageous choice in the Iowa
Gambling Task and in the Game of Dice task (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006). By
accessing the conditioned value of the frame, such as the valence
associated with the semantics of the words win and loss, the amyg-
dala could, in principle motivate individuals towards a sure choice
in a win frame and away from a sure choice in the loss frame.
Weller, Levin, Shiv, and Bechara (2007) reported that patients
with damage to the anterior temporal lobe, which included the
amygdala, gambled more than controls in the gain domain (deci-
sions between gains), but resembled controls in the loss domain
(decisions between losses). Although framing was not speciﬁcally
investigated, and mindful also that these patients had extensive
brain damage, this study does support a role for the amygdala in
the inﬂuence of domain (loss or gain) and, by extension, frame on
risky decisions.
The ACC is thought to bias decision making towards cogni-
tively efﬁcient strategies by acting as a teaching signal (Botvinick,
Open access under CC BY license.2007). Because ACC activationwas greaterwhenparticipants chose
‘against’ the frame (De Martino et al., 2006), it may modulate the
motivational inﬂuence theamygdalaexertsonchoice. Thispossibil-
ity is supported by the greater coupling between the ACC and the
amygdala in participants who were less susceptible to the frame
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2.2. Decision latency
A 2 (frame)×2 (gamble choice) ANOVA on reaction time in con-824 D. Talmi et al. / Neuropsy
Roiser et al., 2009). A similar role might be attributed to OFC, a
egion which correlates with resistance to a frame effect, and with
hich ACC has strong reciprocal connectivity (Kringelbach & Rolls,
004).
The framing effect has an interesting kinship to Pavlovian-
nstrumental Transfer (PIT) effects. PIT refers to the enhancing
ffect of previously conditioned, but irrelevant, cues on instrumen-
al action vigour and choice (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). To the
xtent that PIT and framing rely on the same mechanism, animal
IT results would point to a causal role for the amygdala in framing
iven evidence that amygdala lesions abolish PIT (Cardinal et al.,
002). In humans the inﬂuence of Pavlovian cues on action vigour
as associated with amygdala activation (Talmi, Seymour, Dayan,
Dolan, 2008), although their inﬂuence on choice was not (Bray,
angel, Shimojo, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2008).
Here we set out to test whether the framing effect is impaired
n two patients with Urbach-Wiethe (UW), a rare condition asso-
iated with bilateral amygdala lesions. Given that this condition
as been associatedwith increased risk-takingbehaviours,wehave
lso examined overall gambling frequency in these patients with
he prediction that it may be increased relative to controls.
. Methods
.1. Participants
.1.1. Patients
Two German 34-year-old female twins with Lipoid proteinosis (UW) disease
ho were previously characterized by Hurlemann et al. (2007) took part in the
tudy. While BG suffered a single epileptic grand-mal seizure aged 12, AM has never
uffered an epileptic seizure. Cranial computer tomography showed bilateral calci-
cation lesions that symmetrically span the whole amygdala region (Hurlemann et
l., 2010). Both patients had average intelligence according to LPS-4 (Horn, 1983),
xhibited mostly intact performance in an extensive neuropsychological test bat-
ery, and were neither depressed nor anxious (see supplemental text). The patients
xhibited common limited neuropsychological impairments in phonemic ﬂuency
nd in the d2 test, a sustained visual cancellation task tapping short-term concen-
ration (Brickenkamp, 1995). AM was also impaired in ﬁgural learning and memory
see supplemental text).
.1.2. Controls
20 age-and-education matched female German controls were recruited from
he community. 12 were paid by the hour and 8 were told they would receive the
mount they won in the task. We combined them as there were no differences
etween these control groups, nor interactions with experimental factors. Controls
ere administered the LPS and the d2 test and performed better on those tests
elative to the patients (see Table 1). The study was approved by the Research Ethics
ommittee at the University of Bonn.
.2. Procedure
The procedure replicated a previously reported paradigm (De Martino et al.,
006) but here we report only the ﬁrst session (of three) because of concerns with
ur patient’s ability to concentrate for long periods of time. The pattern of results
oes not change if we include all sessions. At the start of each trial, participants
ere endowed with an initial amount. They were then asked to choose between a
ure amount and a gamble. The gamble was presented as a pie chart, showing the
hances of winning and losing as portions of the pie, with the win and lose portions
oloured green and red, respectively. In half the experimental trials the sure amount
as framed as the amount participants would keep of the initial endowment (‘win
rame’). In the other half, the sure amount was framed as the amount participants
ould lose of the initial endowment (‘lose frame’).
able 1
haracteristics of patients and control participants.
Age Education (years) LPS-4 d2
Controls 35.19 13 115 42.05
AM 34 13 107.5 8
BG 34 13 92.5 7
ote. LPS-4 (Leistungsprüfsystem) is a non-verbal reasoning test that is thought to
e a measure of intelligence (Horn, 1983) and d2 is a sustained visual cancellation
ask tapping short-term concentration (Brickenkamp, 1995).ia 48 (2010) 1823–1827
The expected value of the gamble, namely the magnitude participants could
win times the probability of winning, was identical to that of the sure amount. For
example, following a D 50 endowment a sure win of D 10 or a sure loss of D 40 may
be paired with 20% chance of winning D 50, with both options having an expected
value of D 10. The endowments varied between D 25 and D 100. For each of the
two frames, there were 8 trials with each of four wining probabilities comprising
20%–40%–60%–80%, amounting to 64 experimental trials in total. Thirty-two ‘catch’
trials (a third of all trials) were included to verify that participants understood and
attended to the task so as to make considered decisions. Half were presented with
the win and half with the loss frame. In these trials the sure amount was always
half the endowment. In gamble-weighted trials the gamble had markedly higher
expected value than the sure amount (95% of winning the endowment), and sure-
weighted trials the gamble had a markedly lower expected value (5% chance of
winning the endowment). We excluded 6 controls who decided irrationally, pre-
ferring the gamble in sure-weighted trials or the sure amount in gamble-weighted
trials.
2. Results
The framing effect in controls was robust: they gambled, on
average, 22.59% more frequently in the loss than in the win frame,
t(19) =4.13, p= .001. Risk-neutral decisions in this task correspond
to 50% gamble frequency. Controls were risk-averse in the loss
frame, t(19) =2.66, p< .05, and did not differ signiﬁcantly from risk-
neutrality in the win frame, t(19) =1.86, p=0.08. Fig. 1 shows that
thepatients also exhibited a framing effect. They gambledmore fre-
quently (AM: 15%; BG: 18%) in the loss than in the win frame. The
magnitudeof the framingeffect in thepatientswaswithinone stan-
dard deviation of the effect in controls (AM: Z=−.26, BG: Z=−.14).
There were no signiﬁcant differences, t<1, between the framing
effect in each patient and in controls according to the Revised Stan-
dardized Difference Test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2005).
Fig. 1 also reveals that overall, patients gambledmore frequently
than controls, a difference that exceeded 1.645 standard deviations
(the 95% conﬁdence interval) under both frames in BG (both win
and loss Z=1.70), and under the loss frame in AM (loss: Z=1.70;
win: Z=1.49). The Crawford t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002)
showed a non-signiﬁcant trend in this direction in both patients
under both frames [loss: AM: t(20) =1.45, p= .08; BG: t(20) =1.66,
p= .06; win: AM and BG gambled equally frequently, t(20) =1.66,
p= .06; all tests one-tailed]. This means that in the loss frame an
estimated 92% of the healthy population would gamble less than
AM and 94% would gamble less than BG; in the win frame, an esti-
mated 94% of the controls would gamble less than the patients.
2.1. Catch trials
There was no difference between the performance of patients
and controls on catch trials, all t<1 (Fig. 2).trols revealed that deciding to gamble was slower than deciding
Fig. 1. Gamble frequency in patients and controls in win and loss frames. Both
patients demonstrated a framing effect, which was not different than that of con-
trols. Error bars represent standard error. The dotted line represents risk neutrality.
D. Talmi et al. / Neuropsycholog
Fig. 2. Gamble frequency in patients and controls in catch trials as a function of
frame (win and loss) and choice utility of the choice (weighted in favour of the sure
amount or the gamble). Error bars represent standard error.
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O’Doherty, 2007), and tended more than controls to choose theig. 3. Decision latency in patients and controls as a function of frame (win and loss)
nd decision (to take the sure amount or gamble). Error bars represent standard
rror.
o take the sure amount, F(1,19) =6.78, p< .05 (Fig. 3); none of the
ther effects were signiﬁcant. AM was faster than controls over-
ll but exhibited the same latency pattern. BG was slower than
ontrols overall but exhibited an opposite latency pattern. Regard-
ess of these timing differences, both patients had similar gambling
requency and an equivalent framing effect. Two-tailed Crawford
-tests showed a non-signiﬁcant trend in this direction for decid-
ng to take the sure amount in the win frame [AM: t(20) =−1.8,
= .09; BG: t(20) =1.97, p= .06] and BG was signiﬁcantly slower
rom controls when deciding to take the sure amount in the loss
rame [t(20) =2.17, p< .05]. All other effects were not signiﬁcant,
> .1.
.3. LPS and d2
Given the difference between patients and controls in LPS
nd d2, we examined the correlation in controls between each
f these measurements and the framing effect, as well as the
verall gambling frequency. None of the correlations were signif-
cant (LPS/framing: r=0; d2/framing: r= .19; LPS/gambling: r=.24;
2/gambling: r=−.18, all p> .10).
. DiscussionTwo UW patients with congenital, complete bilateral amygdala
egeneration exhibited an intact framing effect. Patients gambled
ore frequently when the decision was framed as a potential loss
han when it was framed as a potential gain. The inﬂuence of theia 48 (2010) 1823–1827 1825
framewas equivalent in patients and controls. This result is surpris-
ing because two fMRI studies (De Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al.,
2009)using the same task found that the interactionbetween frame
and the decision to gamble modulated amygdala activation. Specif-
ically, in the win frame, amygdala activation was greater when
participants chose the sure amount over the gamble; by contrast, in
the loss frame, amygdala activation was greater when participants
chose the gamble over the sure option.
A positive ﬁnding was our observation that across frames,
patients gambled more frequently than controls. This can be quan-
tiﬁed as an estimate that more than 90% of healthy controls would
gamble less than the patients. Our study is therefore consistent
with previous results (Bechara et al., 1999; Weller et al., 2007) that
patients with amygdala lesions take more risks. Weller et al. (2007)
also report that amygdala patients were riskier than controls, but
only in the gain domain and not in the loss domain. Similarly, in
our study the patients’ propensity for risk was manifested in both
frames, but was more apparent in the win frame, where patients
were risk-seeking but controls slightly, although not signiﬁcantly,
risk-averse (bothwere risk-seeking in the loss frame). Anotabledif-
ference between the two studies is that in our study, the win frame
attenuated a risk-taking propensity in both controls and patients,
while Weller et al. (2007) report that domain had such an effect in
controls alone.
There are a number of difﬁculties in directly comparing the
aforementioned studies. First, the interaction between domain and
group in Weller et al. (2007) appears stronger in sure-weighted
trials, where the risky choice had a lower expected value than
the sure amount (their ‘risk disadvantageous’ trials). This interac-
tion appears smaller in balanced trials, where both choices had
equal expected value, and disappears in gamble-weighted trials
(their ‘risk advantageous’ trials, see Weller et al., Fig. 1). How-
ever, the authors did not report whether this interaction was
signiﬁcant overall or signiﬁcant in the balanced condition, which
most approximates our task. Second, choice domain in our task is
ambiguous because in each trial, both choices may be construed
as losses (relative to the initial endowment) or gains (relative
to subject’s real ﬁnancial situation). However, we think it most
likely that differences between the two studies reﬂect differences
in patient populations: Weller et al. (2007) used patients with
extensive temporal lobe damage, who most likely acquired their
lesion in adulthood (lesion aetiology was not reported). We dis-
cuss below evidence that congenital and adult-acquired amygdala
lesions result in different phenotypes.
A critical question is why amygdala lesions should enhance risk
propensity. Brand et al. (2006) proposed this might stem from co-
morbid executive function impairment, because their two riskier
patients had executive impairments, while the third, who took less
risk, did not. In view of the fact that both our patients exhibit intact
executive function this account does not explain their increased
risk propensity.
A more likely explanation for patients’ increased risk propen-
sity, we believe, has to do with their ability to learn from feedback,
a ﬁnding with links to animal models where amygdala lesions are
associated with an inﬂexible coding of associations (Cardinal et
al., 2002). In humans, Bechara et al. (1999) suggest that attenu-
ated anticipatory SCR in patients with amygdala lesions reﬂect the
patients’ inability to learn from their own autonomic response to
wins and losses. Amygdala-lesionedpatients tended to switch their
response away from the previously rewarding stimulus even when
this strategy was disadvantageous (Hampton, Adolphs, Tyszka, &risky, disadvantageous option even when it had previously led to a
loss (Brand et al., 2006). Hampton et al. also found that the expres-
sion of obtained reward and punishment in the ventral prefrontal
cortex was equivalent in patients and controls, but only in controls
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id this response correlatewith expected reward. Althoughhere no
eedback was given during task performance, a lifelong uncoupling
etween representations of expected and obtained reward, and a
igid encoding of associations between choices and consequences,
ould alter the way UW patients evaluate safe and risky outcomes,
hereby increasing a propensity to take risks. When interpreting
his aspect of our results note that the trend for different gamble
requency in patients and controls was substantial in magnitude
ut not signiﬁcant statistically.
There are two ways to reconcile the present results and imag-
ng data. First, although neuroimaging data show an association
etween amygdale and the framing effect, this correlation does
ot imply causation. Disparities between amygdala activation in
MRI and lesion results have previously been raised in the domain
f emotion recognition. For example, a number of fMRI stud-
es found that amygdala activation did not distinguish between
range of negative and happy facial expressions (Derntl et al.,
009; Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006;Winston,
’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). By contrast, 9 patients with bilat-
ral amygdala lesions were selectively impaired in recognizing
egative emotions, most impaired on recognizing fear, and none
as impaired on recognizing happiness (Adolphs et al., 1999).
hen participants perform the framing task the amygdala may
e signalling the overall higher positive value of frame-compatible
hoices but may not have a causal role in choosing. Instead, ACC
nd/or OFC may exert a causal inﬂuence, a suggestion given weight
y evidence that activation in these regions, as well as coupling
etween ACC and amygdala, increases when participants make
hoices ‘against’ the frame (De Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al.,
009). Such a role for OFC ties in with a evidence this structure
ncodes stimulus-reward associations in a ﬂexible manner and is
ritical for an animal’s ability to overcome inﬂexible associations
ncoded in the amygdala (Stalnaker, Franz, Singh, & Schoenbaum,
007).
Second, UW is often considered a paradigmatic amygdala dis-
ase model. It is nevertheless the case that UW may impact upon
he trajectory of development so that UW patients may not be a
ure model for loss of amygdala given the possibility of compen-
ation by other brain regions. Animal data support this possibility
ecauseneonatal vs. adult-onsetbilateral amygdala lesions inmon-
eys result in different phenotypes. For example,monkeys lesioned
t infancy display more fear in social situations (Amaral et al.,
003), which is not expressed in monkeys who acquire amygdala
esions in adulthood. Although the exact time of onset of amygdala
esions in our patients is unknown, UW is a congenital condi-
ion and some signs of UW (e.g. hoarse cries) can be detected in
nfancy. It is admittedly difﬁcult to test the inﬂuence of age of lesion
nsets because damage to the amygdala acquired in adulthood
ften extends beyond the amygdala. However, careful studies of
atients with gross bilateral lesions could illuminate this possibil-
ty. Thus, while the amygdala may play a causal role in the framing
ffect in healthy controls, other regions, such as ACC or OFC, may
ave taken over this function in UW patients.
It is a weakness of the study that we did not acquire SCR data,
hich would have been particularly interesting given the patients’
ntact behavioural performance on our task. Because there was
o feedback in our task, the differential response to the frame
ust be due to the value the frame acquired pre-experimentally.
t is unclear how amygdala lesions would inﬂuence the autonomic
esponse to the frame. Work in animal models shows that amyg-
ala lesions donot abolish all conditioned responses. In humans the
attern has been somewhat mixed, with amygdala lesions attenu-
ting SCR responses to wins and losses (Bechara et al., 1999; Brand
t al., 2006) but leaving intact responses to the patients’ own name,
amiliar faces, emotional words and pictures (Tranel & Damasio,
989; Tranel & Hyman, 1990).ia 48 (2010) 1823–1827
The inﬂuence of amygdala lesions on real-life emotion and
decision making has not been explored in detail. A diary study
(Anderson & Phelps, 2002) observed intact magnitude and fre-
quency of self-reported positive and negative affect in SP, a patient
with bilateral amygdala lesions who acquired her right amyg-
dala lesion through neurosurgery at the age of 48 years, at which
time her left amygdala lesion was also discovered. In patient
SM, UW led to subtle but distinct effects. SM’s seeming lack
of negative emotions regarding traumatic events led psycholo-
gists unaware of her condition to describe her as being ‘heroic’
(Tranel, Gullickson, Koch, & Adolphs, 2006). SM also demonstrated
inability to judge what personal space others would ﬁnd appro-
priate, and felt comfortable even with minimal personal space
(Kennedy, Glascher, Tyszka, & Adolphs, 2010). Unfortunately, such
data on our patients has not yet been collected. The evidence
so far suggests that not all emotional experiences are depen-
dent on the amygdala, but that the amygdala may play a role in
more extreme emotional reactions and in social-emotional inter-
actions.
We conclude that despite anomalous decision making charac-
teristics evident in an increased propensity to risk behaviour in
patients with amygdala lesions, these patients nevertheless show
an intact framing effect.
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